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Nontechnical Summary
Trade union membership in Germany has declined remarkably in recent decades. By the
year 2004, gross union density, i. e., the ratio of the number of union members and the
number of employees in the German labor market, was down to a historically low level of
27%. Some unions have responded to the decline in size by merging, but to date unions
have not been able to reverse the trend. Moreover, the results of union activity apply to
most of the workers irrespective of membership. Why then do people join a union at all?
This study uses panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel to provide insights
into the determinants of individual union membership and corresponding changes over
time. Our findings based on correlated random effects probit models for West (1985–2003)
and for East Germany (1993–2003) quantify the influence of socio-demographic personal
characteristics, such as age or marital status; the influence of workplace characteristics,
i. e., match, firm, or industry-specific effects; and the influence of attitudinal factors for
the individual choice to be or not to be a union member.
We then use our estimates to project net union density (NUD)—defined as the share of
employed union members in the number of employees—as a measure for union strength
in East and West Germany. The projections consistently trace the trends towards de-
unionization in both parts of the country. Compared to the West, membership in East
Germany started out from a higher level at the beginning of the 1990’s, but exhibited
a stronger decline afterwards. By the year 2003, NUD was even lower in East Germany
than in the West.
The projections are analyzed by means of decomposition techniques in order to shed
light on (1) the changes in unionization over time and (2) the differences in NUD between
East and West Germany. We find that changes in the composition of the work force only
played a minor role for the deunionization trends in both East and West Germany. In
East-West comparison, the West German work force exhibits more attributes supporting
union membership. The higher union density in East Germany in the year 1993 and the
stronger subsequent decline thus reflect a lower quality of membership matches resulting
from the widespread, arbitrary membership recruitment after unification.
The erosion of union membership is likely to weaken the bargaining power of unions
and therefore the unions’ impact on the labor market. Despite the still high coverage of
collective agreements, the results of wage bargaining are likely to deteriorate from the
perspective of union members—but possibly result in higher employment. Based on the
results of this study, the link between union membership, wages, and employment can be
explored in future research.
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1 Introduction
Trade unions bargain for higher wages, equal pay, reduced working hours, fair working con-
ditions, or employment protection (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). However, in Germany—
and in a number of other countries—the results of union activity apply to most of the
workers irrespective of membership. Membership is not compulsory and closed shop reg-
ulations are illegal. The public good character of core services offered by trade unions
may give rise to free-rider behavior.
Thence, why do people join a union? Given the economic importance of union ac-
tivity (Addison and Schnabel, 2003), interest in the determinants of union membership
is of its own right. It is essential to disentangle and quantify the determinants of union
membership in order to understand the recent decline in union membership in developed
countries; see OECD (2004) and Ebbinghaus (2003) for Germany. Moreover, facing the
lack of information on union membership in various data sets, microeconometric mem-
bership estimations can be used to predict union density for homogeneously defined labor
market segments, such as industries and/or regions. These predictions can then be em-
ployed to study the impact of unionization on economic performance, and on employment
and the structure of wages in particular; see Fitzenberger and Kohn (2005). This is
of importance since in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon literature (see the survey by Card,
Lemieux, and Riddell, 2003), it is not meaningful to estimate a wage effect of individual
union membership in Germany, where the public good nature of union activity results in
union coverage being much higher than union density.
For Germany, a couple of microeconometric analyses of union membership using survey
data are available. For example, Windolf and Haas (1989), Lorenz andWagner (1991), and
Schnabel and Wagner (2005) use different sets of cross sectional survey data to estimate
binary choice models of union membership in West Germany. Schnabel and Wagner
(2003) also estimate determinants of union membership in East Germany. However, none
of the above studies employs panel data methods to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
This was first established by Fitzenberger, Haggeney, and Ernst (1999) and Beck and
Fitzenberger (2004), whose analyses for West Germany are based on three and four waves
of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), respectively.
Our study extends upon this literature in two main directions. First, we estimate
determinants of union membership in East as well as in West Germany, using the panel
structure of the GSOEP and applying a Chamberlain (1980)-Mundlack (1978)-type cor-
related random effects probit model. Our estimations are based on six waves during the
period 1985–2003 providing union membership status for individuals in West Germany,
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and on four waves between 1993 and 2003 for East Germany. In fact, it proves important
to control for individual-specific effects in the membership decision. Our findings show
the influence of socio-demographic personal characteristics, such as age or marital status;
the influence of workplace characteristics, i. e., match, firm, or industry specific effects;
as well as the influence of attitudinal factors for the individual choice to be or not to
be a union member, and we analyze differences of these factors between East and West
Germany and across time.
Second, we use our estimates to predict net union density (NUD) as a measure for
union strength in East and West Germany. The predictions, which consistently trace the
trends towards deunionization in both parts of the country, are then analyzed by means
of decomposition techniques in order to shed light on (1) the changes in unionization over
time and (2) the differences in NUD between East and West Germany. We find that
changes in the composition of the work force only played a minor role for the deunioniza-
tion trends in both East and West Germany. In East-West comparison, differences in the
characteristics of the work force are in favor of higher NUD in the West. The stronger
decline in union membership in East Germany reflects a stronger change in the impact of
these characteristics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on
union membership. Section 3 discusses potential determinants of membership decisions.
Our econometric investigation is presented in section 4. Corresponding projections of
net union densities and the decomposition analyses are discussed in section 5. Section 6
concludes. The appendix includes further information on the data and empirical results.
2 Literature Review
Studies of union membership in Germany face three challenges. First, collective bargain-
ing is an open shop system. Negotiation outcomes apply not only to union members, but
to the vast majority of all employees; see, e. g., Bosch (2004). Membership is not com-
pulsory and closed shop regulations are forbidden by constitutional law. By nature, the
core services trade unions offer have public good character, which gives rise to the possi-
bility of free-riding behavior. Thus, why would people want to join a union at all? Who
joins the union? And how much do different determinants such as personal or workplace
characteristics contribute to people’s membership decision?
Second, union membership rates have been steadily declining in recent decades. Fig-
ure 1 depicts gross union density (GUD), defined as the ratio of the number of union
members and the number of employees in the German labor market. After a period of
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slight increases in the 1970’s, the early 1980’s mark the beginning of a pronounced trend
towards deunionization, which started out at a level of about 40%. By 2004, GUD was
down to a historically low level of 27%. Deunionization was merely interrupted by a
unification effect in 1990, when West German institutions were transferred to the East,
and unions were initially very successful in recruiting members in the East. However,
the upsurge in aggregate GUD of about five percentage points (pp)—which was built on
the grounds of the GDR labor organization Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, whose
members had comprised the largest part of the GDR work force—was not sustainable,
and deunionization went on even more rapidly in the 1990’s and 2000’s. Some trade
unions have responded to the decline in size by merging; see, e. g., Keller (2005). To date,
however, unions have not been able to reverse the trend; see also Ebbinghaus (2003) and
Fichter (1997). Against this background, micro-level studies which unveil how individual
membership decisions have been changing over time, can give insight into the nature of
observed trends.
Figure 1: Evolution of Gross Union Density
25
30
35
40
Uni
on 
Den
sity
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Gross union density in percent; 1960–1990: West Germany; 1991–2004: Unified Germany.
Union membership in CGB (Christlicher Gewerkschaftsbund, data until 1999: German Statistical Office
(Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistische Jahrbu¨cher), union information thenceforward), DAG (Deutsche
Angestelltengewerkschaft, until 2000; data: German Statistical Office), DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschafts-
bund, data: www.dgb.de), DBB (Deutscher Beamtenbund, data: www.dgb.de), and DPolG (Deutsche
Polizeigewerkschaft, until 1970, data: German Statistical Office).
Employment (abha¨ngig Bescha¨ftigte ohne mithelfende Familienangeho¨rige) from German Microcensus:
www.destatis.de.
Third of all, the availability of adequate data from union records is limited. From
1991 onwards, only aggregate numbers for unified Germany are available, and unions’
publications do not distinguish between employed members on the one hand and unem-
ployed, retired, or student members on the other. Yet this distinction is important from
an economic point of view. Net union density (NUD), defined as the share of employed
union members in the number of employees, is a better measure of union power than GUD
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because it is more closely related to the union’s financial resources and to the potential
to mobilize workers within firms. Net union density is lower than gross union density by
definition. Estimates of aggregate NUD usually fall short of GUD by about 10 pp and
this difference also varies with the business cycle; see Ebbinghaus (2003). Union power
further differs significantly between different labor market segments. For example, unions
are traditionally strong in manufacturing industries, but they are of minor importance in
personal service sectors. Official membership information does not distinguish between
sufficiently homogenous segments. Detailed NUD estimates obtained from survey data
should thus help providing meaningful measures of union strength.
The following paragraphs review contributions from the theoretical literature and ex-
isting empirical studies on these issues. The purpose is to motivate the determinants
under study and the adequacy of the econometric approach pursued later on; see Naylor
(2003), Riley (1997), and Schnabel (2003) for more extensive surveys.
2.1 Theoretical Analyses
In a traditional cost-benefit framework, potential union members balance the utility de-
rived from being member with the costs associated to it. Membership is costly due
to membership fees, and in an open shop system the key benefits arising from union
bargaining—like higher wages and equal pay, reduced working hours, fair working con-
ditions, or employment protection—are basically public goods. Therefore, a rational
individual would not join a union, but rather free ride in this setting.
Several ways to accommodate the free-rider problem have been considered. First,
membership could be compulsory. Second, membership would be voluntary in a dichoto-
mous labor market with union and non-union sectors (Grossman, 1983), but all employees
in unionized firms choose to be member. Both of these arrangements are essentially closed
shop solutions, where only members are eligible for benefits. However, the German as
well as most European empirical evidence dismisses closed shop solutions.
Third, unions offer selective incentives (Olson, 1965) in addition to the collective
goods. On the one hand, these can be actual private goods (Booth and Chatterji, 1995),
such as legal aid and grievance procedures, accident insurances, or even education and
further training. Moreton (1998), for instance, considers greater job security for union
members. On the other hand, members may comply with a social custom to support the
union. The notion of social custom, as introduced to labor economics by Akerlof (1980),
captures the idea that individuals abide by internal rules or norms set within society
because non-conformance would result in a loss of reputation, which would be costly
for the individual (Booth, 1985). Naylor (1989) considers the case where individuals’
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believes about a social custom are heterogeneous, thereby explaining stable equilibria at
intermediate union densities. Alternatively, the incorporation of management opposition
in Corneo (1995) uses the union’s interaction with other institutional agents to explain
stable intermediate levels of unionization. All of the economic models above rationalize a
minimum level of unionization below which a union loses its ability to effectively provide
services. Reduced services would in turn induce more and more members to quit and, at
the end of the day, the union would cease to exist.
Complementary approaches in social and political sciences (Wallerstein and Western,
2000, for example) discuss internal rules, class consciousness, social values, political at-
titudes, etc. Though difficult to measure, these are considered to be highly relevant for
union membership. Most of these factors are likely to induce unobserved heterogeneity
in the empirical analysis.
2.2 Empirical Studies
There are three important strands of the literature; see Riley (1997) and Schnabel (2003)
for overviews. A first class of studies uses aggregate time series data. In the tradition of
Ashenfelter and Pencavel (1969) the analyses focus on long-run trends and business cycle
effects. For Germany, Armingeon (1989) analyzes changes in union density in the period
1950–1985. He finds that the stability of gross union density was caused by membership
gains in shrinking segments of the labor market on the one hand and stagnation in growing
industries on the other. Similarly, Schnabel (1989) studies trade union growth in the
period 1955–1986 and links it to changes in price levels and wages, employment, and
unemployment. The aggregate evidence stresses the importance of environmental factors.
The second strand of the literature analyzes the impact of institutional regulations
and interactions in social environments. Centralization and coordination of collective
bargaining, coverage rates, and codetermination are the pillars of an industrial relation
system (Hassel, 1999). Interaction between these constituents is closely related to union
membership. For example, union membership of a works council increases union density at
the firm level since it facilitates union access to the work force (Windolf and Haas, 1989).
Similar effects can be expected from a Ghent system of union-managed unemployment
insurance. The contact of union officials to insured employees supports recruitment efforts.
Frege (1996) emphasizes that the membership decision and the question whether people
actually participate in collective action are two separate issues. She finds that there is no
difference in actual behavior of union members between East and West Germany.
The third class of studies uses micro data to model individual membership decisions.
At this level, determinants can be grouped into three categories.
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• Personal characteristics: Observed socio-demographic variables such as age or mari-
tal status, but also attitudes determine an individual’s decision to be union member.
• Workplace characteristics: Match-specific, firm-specific, as well as industry-specific
effects can facilitate or impede unionization.
• Social environment: The influence of reference groups frames the individual decision.
Studies based on micro-level data for Germany analyze membership determinants along
these lines. Windolf and Haas (1989) provide logit estimates based on cross-sectional
survey data for the period 1976–1984 and Lorenz and Wagner (1991) use the 1985 wave of
the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Fitzenberger, Haggeney, and Ernst (1999)
and Beck and Fitzenberger (2004) use various GSOEP waves with union membership
information in 1985, 1989, 1993, and 1998 (only Beck and Fitzenberger) to estimate West
German union membership. Both studies use panel probit estimators and conclude that
the propensity for union membership has not changed considerably over time. Hence,
the observed aggregate decline in union membership was mainly driven by composition
effects.
Goerke and Pannenberg (2004) also use GSOEP data. They employ fixed effects es-
timations to back up a theoretical social custom model. Schnabel and Wagner (2005)
conduct an analysis based on West German data from the general social survey (ALL-
BUS), a collection of independent biannual cross sections. Their probit estimates for years
between 1980 and 2000 yield no consistent picture of the influence of most variables over
time. Applying the same method, Schnabel and Wagner (2003) use the years 1992, 1996,
and 2000 of the ALLBUS data to compare determinants in East and West Germany. They
conclude that the factors influencing an individual’s propensity to be union member have
converged between East and West Germany between 1992 and 2000.
3 Determinants of Union Membership
Our empirical analysis investigates the following theoretical hypotheses about determi-
nants of union membership; see Schnabel (1993) or Beck and Fitzenberger (2004) for more
detailed discussions.
• Age: Mobility tends to decrease with the age of a worker. Family ties and specific
human capital increase with age. Thus, older workers are more interested in job
security and therefore in union membership as an implicit insurance. Yet the interest
in union representation may fade out once people know that they are successful in
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the labor market. The link between age and union membership may also mirror
cohort effects. Differences between generations in value orientation or social custom
may result in different attitudes towards unions; see Blanchflower (2006) for an
extensive discussion.
• Gender: Compared to males, women are less attached to the labor market and
tend to accumulate less specific human capital. Besides, trade union services have
traditionally been directed to the needs of male members. Therefore, women are
less likely to be union members. The higher rate of female labor force participation
in East Germany and its increase in the West should reduce the gender differential.
• Education: Higher education generally implies a higher participation and workplace-
related involvement, hence increasing the propensity for unionization. However,
higher education is usually associated with higher professional status involving a
closer relationship to management, which reduces the desire for a union voice. The
latter effect may outweigh the former in particular for employees with a university
degree, whereas the former may dominate among workers with vocational training
in comparison to less educated workers.
• Marital Status: If both partners of a couple are working, the risk of a job loss is
diversified to some extent, which reduces the need for job protection. However,
married workers are responsible not only for themselves but also for their family.
This would increase the propensity to be a union member, especially with children
or when being the only earner.
• Citizenship: Foreigners can be expected to have a weaker attachment to the German
labor market and cultural differences might be an obstacle to unionization. Thus,
a lower unionization rate among foreigners is likely.
• Political Preference: The historically close relationship between the Social Demo-
cratic Party (SPD) and unions suggests that individuals who share values of the
Social Democrats are more likely to be union members. There also exists a strong
workers’ wing within the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), suggesting a some-
what smaller positive effect for the CDU (relative to the omitted category).
• Wage: Membership fees increase with wages and a higher wage tends to be associ-
ated with a higher professional status, both of which reduce the propensity to join
a union. However, higher wages may indicate higher firm-specific human capital,
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thus increasing the demand for stability. Similar to education, a hump-shaped rela-
tionship may arise with a positive influence for low wage levels and a negative one
for higher wages.
In closed shop systems as, e. g., in the United States, union membership itself may
result in higher wages; see the broad literature on union wage gaps surveyed in Card,
Lemieux, and Riddell (2003). In Germany, however, there are no wage effects of
union membership per se at the individual level; compare the discussion in Goerke
and Pannenberg (2004).
• Employee Status: Trade unions historically evolved as organizations of blue-collar
workers, whose relatively homogenous preferences accommodate unionization ef-
forts. A similar argument applies to civil servants, who share a preference for a
stable work environment. Both of these groups are thus more likely to be union
members compared to white-collar workers. The latter have moved into the focus of
union action only recently with the relative decline of blue-collar employment. With
respect to working time, the weaker labor market adherence of part-time workers
renders them less likely to be union members than full-time workers.
• Unemployment History: Employees who experienced unemployment in the past
might join a union to increase job protection. However, unemployment spells might
be associated with a lower attachment to the labor market, thus reducing member-
ship. The overall effect is ambiguous.
• Job Satisfaction: In cooperation with works councils, unions provide a platform
of voice and support for dissatisfied workers. They can offer legal advice and fi-
nancial support in case of a lawsuit between employer and employee. Therefore,
membership may be more attractive for dissatisfied workers. However, union inter-
mediation also facilitates communication and understanding between employer and
employees which will result in a higher degree of job satisfaction. The overall effect
is ambiguous.
• Tenure: With increasing tenure, the worker accumulates more firm specific human
capital, which would call for protection. At the same time, an increasing job dura-
tion builds up identification with the job, trust, and loyalty towards the employer,
thereby decreasing the propensity to unionize. The overall effect is ambiguous.
• Firm Size: The existence of fixed set-up and organizational costs favors union re-
cruitment in larger firms. Larger firms also provide larger subsets of homogeneous
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workers which accommodate recruitment efforts. Works councils and supervisory
boards in large firms support union access to the firm. Large firms show more scope
for rent sharing and, therefore, the higher is the relevance of wage bargaining. All
of these arguments imply a positive effect.
• Industry: Unions are traditionally pervasive in manufacturing and they are also
strong in the public sector, where competition is generally low and high rents exist
which can be shared between employees and employers. Private services, however,
have less of a union tradition, feature more heterogenous work forces, and face fierce
competition in goods and factor markets as well as rapid structural changes. All of
these factors make union recruitment efforts more difficult in private services.
Each of the above factors may influence union membership differently in East and West
Germany, and its impact may change over time. In addition, further unobserved individual
factors (e. g., social customs) are likely to be of importance.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Correlated Random Effects Probit Model
We employ a Chamberlain (1980)-Mundlack (1978)-type correlated random effects probit
model, which allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity and to take account of
possible correlation of individual- specific effects with observed characteristics. This is
central because it is likely that people’s attitudes towards unions differ considerably and
these attitudes are correlated with observed characteristics.
Let union membership yit of individuals i = 1, 2, ..., N in periods t = 1, 2, ..., T be
captured by a binary choice model
yit =
 1 if y
∗
it ≥ 0
0 else
, (1)
where the latent variable y∗it driving the membership decision of individual i in period t is
a linear function of observable characteristics xit and an unobservable individual-specific,
time-invariant effect ci:
y∗it = xitβ + ci + uit. (2)
The error term uit is assumed to be normally distributed with unit variance in all periods.
The individual-specific effect ci controls for unobserved heterogeneity in the membership
decision. What is more, we consider ci as a random effect which can be correlated to
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some variables in xit. In the tradition of Chamberlain (1980) and Mundlack (1978) we
assume that ci is related to the time averages x¯ji of some variables xjit, and that it follows
a conditional normal distribution
ci|xi1, ..., xiT ∼ N(µ+ x¯iξ, σ2² ), (3)
where σ2² is the variance of ²i in the regression ci = µ+ x¯iξ+ ²i, therefore constituting the
conditional variance of ci. A detailed discussion of this model can be found in Wooldridge
(2002).
Given this specification, the model can be written as
P (yit = 1|xi1, ..., xiT , ci) = Φ (θ(xitβ + µ+ x¯iξ)) , (4)
where θ = (1 + σ2² )
−1/2. As in a standard random effects probit model, the estimation of
(4) is straightforward. Adding x¯i is quite intuitive: β estimates the effect of xit on the
union participation decision at time t, holding the time average x¯i fixed. x¯i contributes
to the decision through its effect on the time-invariant individual- specific effect. Note
that ci can only be correlated to averages of time-varying variables, because the effect of
the average x¯ji of a time-invariant characteristic xjit could not be discriminated from the
direct effect of xjit itself. Furthermore, a constant in xit cannot be distinguished from µ.
Details on the empirical model selection are presented in the next section.
4.2 Data and Model Selection
We use data of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a longitudinal survey of
individuals in private households in the Federal Republic of Germany. The GSOEP
started in (West) Germany in the year 1984, and it was extended to East Germany
in 1990; see Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2003) for detailed information on the GSOEP.
Among others, questions related to the labor market are at the heart of the yearly survey.
The question of membership in a trade union, however, is not included in every wave. Up
to date, six waves contain accordant information for West Germany: 1985, 1989, 1993,
1998, 2001, and 2003. For East Germany, we can use four waves: 1993, 1998, 2001, and
2003. To analyze the determinants of employees’ union membership decisions, we focus
on individuals in gainful dependent employment who are aged between 16 and 65 years
and who earn not more than DM15,000 per month.1 Definitions of variables considered
1We consider the earnings threshold in order to measure the impact of EARNINGS in the main part
of the distribution, which is skewed to the right. Median earnings lie between DM2,000 (East, 1993)
and DM3,000 (West, 2003) per month, and the 99% quantile varies between DM5,100 (East, 1993) and
DM10,00 (West, 2003). However, there are outliers with earnings as high as DM31,400. Applying the
earnings threshold, we lose only 22 observations in West Germany and none in East Germany.
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in the analysis can be found in tables 2 and 3 in the appendix. Tables 4 and 5 report
summary statistics for our subsamples of West and East Germany, respectively.
In order to avoid the loss of a large number of observations due to missing values,
we add dummy variables for missings in single regressors into the regression equations.
In particular, we include dummy variables for missing values in ABITUR, FIRM-SIZE,
and SECTOR since these variables contribute most to the problem of missing values.
At the same time, some individuals appear in several, but not in all sample periods—
due to unemployment spells, for example. We control for this by introducing missing-
period dummies. For instance, a vector (1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) is assigned to West German
individuals observed only in 1993 and 2001—that is, the third and the fifth of the six
waves. Furthermore, time dummies and interactions of these with other regressors are
included to allow each of the effects to vary between different years.
We estimate several specifications of model (4), separately for both West and East
Germany. These specifications are as follows:
(A) Selected Model: The estimation of a random effects probit model is computationally
involved due to the numerical integration needed. Therefore, we start by applying
pooled probit estimations, which are consistent and need significantly less computa-
tion time, to select variables for a preferred specification. The resulting specification
is then estimated and tested by means of a random effects probit.
More specifically, we first apply a backward selection procedure to select those
time-average regressors in x¯i which are correlated to the individual- specific ef-
fect. Starting from a model which includes all xjit as well as averages of all
time-varying regressors, we stepwise drop the x¯ji which is least significant, until
all remaining averages are significant at the 5% level. At the end of this stage,
the list of variables related to the individual- specific effect comprises for West
Germany: CHRISTIAN-DEMOCRAT, SOCIAL-DEMOCRAT, WHITE-COLLAR,
TRAINEE, UNEMPLOYMENT HISTORY, EARNINGS, FIRM-SIZE, and SEC-
TOR. For East Germany, EARNINGS, TENURE, FIRM-SIZE, and SECTOR turn
out to be correlated to the individual- specific effect.
Given the above choice of x¯i, we estimate specifications which include interactions
of the regressors xit with year dummies in order to allow for the possibility of
time-varying coefficients. Again, effects significant at the 5% level are kept as time-
varying. At this stage, the variations of AGE and AGE SQUARED are tested
jointly, and so are the variations of EARNINGS and EARNINGS SQUARED as
well as those of the SECTOR and the FIRM-SIZE categories.
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At the end, we estimate a correlated random effects probit model using the selected
variables and test it against a model which again includes averages of all time-
varying regressors. Joint significance of the excluded variables is rejected for both
West and East Germany.
(B) Reduced Selected Model: Some regressors xjit which are generally time-varying show
only limited variation within individuals. For example, an individual’s educational
attainment rarely changes during his or her working life, and civil servants seldom
change back to a private employer. Nevertheless, the averages of these variables
might turn out significant in the selected model (A). This could be due to problems
of multicollinearity, with the direct effects of xjit becoming insignificant. For this
reason, we also estimate a model without averages of educational attainment and
vocational status variables.
(C) Benchmark Model: We further estimate a standard random effects probit as a bench-
mark model. Here we use the same procedure as described above to consider time-
varying coefficients, but we do not include any averages x¯i.
(D) IABS Model: Estimates of individual union membership status can be used to pre-
dict union densities; compare section 5. Accordant predictions can be based on
different data sets with larger sample sizes in order to achieve more detailed and
more precise predictions.2 In order to facilitate predictions for individuals in the IAB
employment sample (IAB Bescha¨ftigtenstichprobe, IABS) 1975–2001, we estimate an
additional specification, using only those explanatory variables which are available
in the IABS. This specification excludes the variables CHRISTIAN-DEMOCRAT,
SOCIAL-DEMOCRAT, SATISFACTION, TENURE, and MARRIED. The estima-
tion for East Germany further excludes UNEMPLOYMENT HISTORY because the
IABS offers accounts for individuals in East Germany from 1992 onward only. We
also incorporate the fact that the IABS distinguishes between different vocational
statuses only among full-timers. In all other respects the selection process is the
same as in (A).
(E) GSES Model: For the same purpose as in (D), we also estimate a specification
which includes only variables available in the German Structure of Earnings Survey
2Most large micro-level data sets for Germany—such as the administrative IAB employment sample
or the Structure of Earnings Survey carried out by the German Statistical Office—provide no information
on union membership. In order to take advantage of the big sample sizes of these data sets membership
propensities thus have to be imputed.
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(GSES, Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung) 2001. We thus exclude CHRISTIAN-
DEMOCRAT, SOCIAL-DEMOCRAT, SATISFACTION, UNEMPLOYMENTHIS-
TORY, FOREIGNER, and MARRIED. Since the GSES is a cross-sectional data set,
this specification is estimated without averages x¯i.
4.3 Estimation Results
Estimated coefficients for West and East Germany are reported in tables 6 and 7 in the
appendix. Note that there are only four specifications for East Germany because the
selected and the reduced selected specification coincide for the East. In the following, we
compare the different models and then turn to our preferred models in more detail.
Comparing first the correlated random effects models (A) and (B) to the benchmark
models (C), we find significance of several elements of ξ for both parts of the country.
Individual-specific effects are in fact correlated to averages x¯i of some observed character-
istics, for which the effects in the benchmark model are quite similar to the joint impact
of the direct effect and the indirect effect through ci in the models (A) and (B). Yet the
economic reasoning behind the estimated determinants is more subtle in the correlated
models. The latter do not only take account of direct impacts on the membership decision,
but also allow for the possibility that some determinants are correlated with unobserved
individual-specific attitudes towards unions, which again drive the membership decision.
Given this richer interpretation and the statistical significance of ξ, we prefer the models
(A) and (B) to the benchmark ones (C). There are only small differences of coefficients
βj for those variables xjit whose time-averages are not included.
When comparing the selected specification (A) to the reduced selected model (B), we
also find very similar effects. In fact, the direct effect of being a TRAINEE is even in-
significant if the corresponding average is included. This finding suggests multicollinearity
between the regressor and its average. Predictions based on either specification should
not differ fundamentally, though. Both specifications yield very similar percentages of
correct predictions. Since, above all, the true channel through which the determinants
work is not clear a priori, we prefer the statistically validated specification (A).
The IABS models (D) and the GSES models (E) include only regressors that are
also available in the respective target data sets. Estimated coefficients for the included
variables are generally very similar to the results obtained from the full models, and
predictive power is also comparable. More specifically, recalling that the GSES is a cross-
sectional data set, the coefficients of specifications (E) match those from the benchmark
models (C). The coefficients of the IABS models (D) match the results of specifications
(A).
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We now describe the preferred specifications (A) in more detail. Results for East
and for West Germany are remarkably similar despite some notable exceptions. First,
the baseline (TIME dummies) and the impacts of EARNINGS and UNEMPLOYMENT
HISTORY are the only effects which vary significantly across time in the East, whereas
some more effects vary in the West. On the one hand this is to be expected given the
longer sample period for West Germany. On the other hand, East-West convergence
(Schnabel and Wagner, 2003) is likely to be driven by changes in the East. Second, while
MARRIED individuals ceteris paribus have a lower propensity to be a union member in the
West, the respective effect is significantly positive in the East. This finding likely reflects
East-West differences in labor force participation. Third, working PART-TIME has the
expected negative sign in West Germany, but it has a positive but insignificant effect in
East Germany. Fourth, differences between sectors are stronger in East Germany, and
most direct SECTOR effects are insignificant, possibly due to the relatively small number
of observations in some sectors (compare table 5) and to less within-individual variation.
The coefficients are generally allowed to vary over time. However, most of the effects
do not change significantly. Those which do change mainly show a consistent, monotonic
pattern. For instance, both the linear effect of AGE and the curvature effect of AGE
SQUARED decrease in West Germany over some time, rendering the total impact less
concave. In East Germany, the impact of EARNINGS becomes also less concave. Thus, in
contrast to Beck and Fitzenberger (2004) and Schnabel and Wagner (2005), we find some
clear patterns of changes. For East Germany, we find a significant positive time effect
only for 1993, whereas for West Germany there is a negative time trend throughout the
entire sample period. Therefore, the estimated time trend contributes to the continuous
deunionization in West Germany but not in East Germany.
Turning to the effects of the covariates, we can confirm most of the hypotheses in sec-
tion 3. Women are less likely to be union members. The effect of FOREIGNER is positive
but not significant in East Germany. We further find that a positive, concave impact of
AGE. As expected, supporters of the Social Democrats (but not those of the Christian
Democrats) have a higher propensity to join a union. Regarding education, ABITUR and
UNIVERSITY have a sizeable negative impact, but the influence of APPRENTICESHIP
is not as clear. In contrast to SEMISKILLED and—even more substantially—SKILLED
BLUE-COLLAR workers, CIVIL SERVANTS and WHITE-COLLAR workers show a sig-
nificantly lower propensity. The effect for individuals working PART-TIME has the ex-
pected negative sign in West Germany, but it is positive and insignificant in the East.
The effect of UNEMPLOYMENT HISTORY is negative. However, the effect of average
UNEMPLOYMENT HISTORY is strongly positive. Employees who have recently been
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unemployed are less likely to be union member due to their lower labor market attach-
ment, whereas employees who are generally at a higher risk of unemployment have a
higher need for protection. Job SATISFACTION shows virtually no effect in the West
and only a limited one in the East.
The concave effect of EARNINGS generally meets our expectations. As discussed
above, the impact becomes flatter over time in East Germany. The EARNINGS effect
is more sizeable in East Germany, being attenuated by converse effects through aver-
age EARNINGS and average EARNINGS SQUARED. The positive but small TENURE
coefficient supports the human capital argument. In contrast, FIRM-SIZE shows a sub-
stantial positive impact. However, the differences between firms with more than 200
employees and ones with more than 2000 are negligible. Finally, considerable differences
in unionization exist between industries. Compared to our reference SECTOR “Miscel-
laneous Manufacturing (7)”, the large positive effects of “Chemical Products (5)” and
the formerly public industries “Transport and Communication (11)” are most striking.
In contrast, “Hotels and Restaurants (10)”, “Financial Intermediation (12)”, or “Other
Services (16)” show significantly lower union membership.
5 Prediction and Decomposition Analysis
Based on our preferred models, we predict propensities to be a union member for each of
the individuals in our samples. These propensities can be averaged to an estimator for
net union density. More specifically, we estimate net union density NUDrt separately for
regions r ∈ {East, West} in each year t by
N̂UDrt = N
−1
rt
Nrt∑
i=1
Φ
(
θˆrt(xirtβˆ
rt + µˆrt + x¯irξˆ
rt)
)
. (5)
The observed as well as the predicted net union densities are depicted in figure 2. In
general, the predicted densities match the observed frequencies fairly well. Compared to
the West, membership in East Germany started out at a higher level in the year 1993,
but exhibited a stronger decline afterwards. NUD for 1993 and 2003 were 38% and 19%
in East and 27% and 21% in West Germany.3 Aggregate NUD is about 10 percentage
points (pp) lower than gross union density (compare section 2).
3Estimates of individual union membership can generally be used to predict densities for more narrowly
defined labor market segments. Lorenz and Wagner (1991), Fitzenberger, Haggeney, and Ernst (1999),
and Beck and Fitzenberger (2004), for instance, predict union densities for two-digit industries. In
particular, the latter studies impute membership propensities for individuals in the IAB employment
sample, taking advantage of the bigger sample size of this data set to achieve more detailed and more
precise NUD predictions.
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Figure 2: Net Union Density in East and West Germany
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We now investigate (1) the changes of NUD over time and (2) the differences in NUD
between East and West Germany by means of Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) decom-
position techniques, which we adapt to the nonlinear probit framework. To decompose
the changes of NUD within the two regions between 1993 and 2003,4 we write
N̂UD2003 − N̂UD1993 = (N̂UD2003 − N̂UD19932003)︸ ︷︷ ︸
coefficients effect
+ (N̂UD
1993
2003 − N̂UD1993)︸ ︷︷ ︸
characteristics effect
(6)
= (N̂UD2003 − N̂UD20031993)︸ ︷︷ ︸
characteristics effect
+ (N̂UD
2003
1993 − N̂UD1993)︸ ︷︷ ︸
coefficients effect
, (7)
where N̂UDt are estimated as described in equation (5). The decompositions (6) and (7)
differ with respect to the chosen counterfactual densities N̂UD
t˜
t. In equation (6), N̂UD
1993
2003
denotes the prediction for individuals in the year 2003, assuming that the coefficients
stayed as in 1993. In equation (7), N̂UD
2003
1993 uses predictions for individuals in 1993 based
on the coefficients of 2003. To investigate the sensitivity of the decomposition result, we
compute both versions (6) and (7).5 The characteristics effect involves the part of the
4It would also have been possible to analyze the change for West Germany over the even longer period
1985–2003. However, we opt for 1993–2003 in order to facilitate East-West comparisons in table 1.
5It is well-known that the decompositions resulting from the different counterfactuals do not necessarily
yield identical results. Different approaches to the issue of non-uniqueness have been proposed in the
literature; see Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) and Silber and Weber (1999) for surveys. Yet each of the
approaches relies on ad-hoc assumptions of some type, so we choose to report the two most prominent
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overall change between 1993 and 2003 which can be attributed to changes in personal,
workplace, and social characteristics of the individuals in the sample at given coefficients.
The coefficients effect captures the part which is due to changes in the coefficients at given
characteristics. The necessary counterfactuals can be estimated as averages analogous to
equation (5).
For the differences between East (E) and West (W ) Germany in any given year, we
use
N̂UDW − N̂UDE = (N̂UDW − N̂UDEW )︸ ︷︷ ︸
coefficients effect
+ (N̂UD
E
W − N̂UDE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
characteristics effect
(8)
= (N̂UDW − N̂UDWE )︸ ︷︷ ︸
characteristics effect
+ (N̂UD
W
E − N̂UDE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
coefficients effect
, (9)
where the involved counterfactual densities N̂UD
r˜
r are defined as above.
The results of the different decompositions are reported in table 1. Standard errors to
assess the accuracy of the decompositions are obtained by means of a parametric bootstrap
by resampling from the estimated distribution of the parameters (βrt ′, µrt, ξrt ′, σrt² )
′
.
Table 1: Differences in Net Union Density: Decomposition Analyses
Net Union Density [%] Char. Coeff.
1993 2003 Change Effecta Effecta
West 26.71 20.97 -5.74 -1.81 (0.58) -3.93 (0.80)
Germany (0.57) (0.61) (0.71) -0.4 (0.55) -5.34 (0.82)
East 38.03 18.78 -19.25 -3.56 (1.84) -15.69 (1.70)
Germany (1.67) (1.22) (1.12) -0.11 (1.64) -19.14 (2.18)
Difference -11.32 2.19
(1.75) (1.35)
Char. Effectb 4.7 7.94 6.03 6.37
(4.27) (0.66) (2.77) (0.56)
Coeff. Effectb -16.02 -19.26 -3.84 -4.18
(4.13) (1.80) (2.80) (1.44)
a Counterfactual with characteristics of 2003/1993 in normal/italic font.
b Counterfactual with West/East characteristics in normal/italic font.
Standard errors in parentheses estimated by 1000 bootstrap resamples. Data source: GSOEP.
The results are not very sensitive to the choice of counterfactuals in (6) and (7), nor
in (8) and (9). Interpreting first the (horizontal) decompositions of the changes in NUD
cases.
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over time, both characteristics and coefficients effects contribute to the observed deunion-
ization. However, the coefficients effect dominates in almost all cases. The characteristics
effect does not explain more than a third of the 6 pp decline in West Germany and does
not even account for a fifth of the 19 pp decline in the East. This result is in contrast
to the finding in Beck and Fitzenberger (2004) that the decline in union density in West
Germany between the 1980’s and 1990’s was mainly driven by changes in the composition
of the work force.6 The small impact of the characteristics effect in East Germany is quite
remarkable in light of the structural change during the 1990’s; compare the summary sta-
tistics in tables 4 and 5. The strong coefficients effect involves the negative time trend as
well as changing impacts of particular characteristics.
Regarding the (vertical) East-West comparison, the characteristics effects and the
coefficients effects generally work in opposite directions. The characteristics effect is in
favor of a higher density in West Germany by 5 to 7 pp: The composition of the West
German work force exhibits more attributes supporting union membership. Thus, the
higher NUD in East Germany in 1993 resulted from differences in the coefficients in the
order of 16 to 19 pp: For given characteristics, East Germans were more strongly unionized
than West Germans. This finding suggests a lower quality of union membership matches
in East Germany resulting from the widespread, arbitrary recruitment after unification.
A stronger decline in union membership thus comes as no surprise. Ten years later, in
2003, union density in East Germany is already 2 pp smaller than in West Germany.
The composition of the work force still being more in favor of union membership in the
West, the coefficients in the two parts of the country have become more similar such that
the—still negative—coefficients effect has lost its bite.
6 Conclusions
The importance of unions in the German labor market is undisputed. However, the ques-
tion why people join a union is anything but beyond dispute. This study uses detailed
micro-panel data to provide insights into the determinants of individual union mem-
bership. We use the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) to estimate membership
equations for West (1985–2003) and for East Germany (1993–2003). The application of
a Chamberlain (1980)-Mundlack (1978)-type correlated random effects probit model con-
trols for unobserved heterogeneity and allows for a correlation between individual- specific
effects and observed characteristics.
Our findings quantify the influence of socio-demographic personal characteristics, such
6Note that Beck and Fitzenberger (2004) do not apply decomposition techniques.
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as age or marital status; the influence of workplace characteristics, i. e., match, firm, or
industry specific effects; and the influence of attitudinal factors for the individual choice
to be or not to be a union member. The membership equations are allowed to differ
between East and West Germany and over time.
Projections of net union densities (NUD) based on our estimates consistently trace
the trends towards deunionization in both parts of the country. Compared to the West,
membership in East Germany started out from a higher level at the beginning of the
1990’s, but exhibited a stronger decline afterwards. By the year 2003, NUD was even
lower in East Germany than in the West.
Decomposition analyses shed light on (1) the changes in unionization over time and
(2) on the differences in NUD between the two regions. Changes in the composition of the
work force do in no case explain more than one third of the observed decline in NUD over
time. In East-West comparison, the West German work force exhibits more attributes
supporting union membership. The higher union density in East Germany in the year
1993 and the stronger subsequent decline reflect a lower quality of membership matches
resulting from the widespread, arbitrary membership recruitment after unification.
The erosion of union membership in Germany is likely to weaken the bargaining power
of unions and therefore the unions’ impact on the labor market (Fitzenberger and Kohn,
2005). Despite the still high coverage of collective agreements (especially in West Ger-
many), the results of wage bargaining are likely to deteriorate from the perspective of
union members—but possibly result in higher employment. We plan to explore the link
between union membership, wages, and employment in future research, for which the
results of this study provide a necessary input.
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Appendix
Table 2: Description of Variables
Dummy Variables = 1 if true
MEMBER being a union member
FEMALE being female
MARRIED being married
FOREIGNER being a foreigner
Education:
ABITUR “Abitur” is the highest educational attainment
APPRENTICESHIP apprenticeship or a similar vocational training is
the highest professional degree
UNIVERSITY person has obtained a technical college or a university degree
Political Orientation:
CHRISTIAN-DEMOCRAT person feels close to the Christian Democratic Party
SOCIAL-DEMOCRAT person feels close to the Social Democratic Party
Vocational Status:
PART-TIME working part-time
SEMISKILL-BLUE being an unskilled or a semi-skilled blue-collar worker
SKILL-BLUE being a skilled blue-collar worker
WHITE-COLLAR being a white-collar worker
CIVIL SERVICE being employed in the civil service
TRAINEE being currently in professional training
UNEMPLOYMENT HISTORY person has been unemployed at least once during past 5 years
(10 years for 1985 wave)
Firm Size:
FIRM-SIZE19 firm has less than 20 employees
FIRM-SIZE199 firm has 20–199 employees
FIRM-SIZE1999 firm has 200–1999 employees
FIRM-SIZE MORE firm has more than 1999 employees
SECTORj: working in sector ja
MISSINGt: person is not observed in year t
TIMEt: observation is in year t
Other Variables
AGE age of person divided by 10
EARNINGS total earnings last month in thousands of DM,
at constant prices (1985 = 100)
TENURE duration of employment in the current firm, in years
SATISFACTION satisfaction of the worker with her/his job, scaled from
0 (not satisfied) to 10 (very satisfied)
a See table 3 for the industry classification and grouping of sectors.
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Table 3: NACE Industry Classification in the GSOEP and Grouping Used in our Empirical
Analysis
No.a Industry NACEb
01 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing; Mining;
Energy and Water Supply
01–14, 40–41
02 Manufacture of Food, Beverages, and To-
bacco
15–16
03 Textiles 17–19
04 Woodwork, Paper, Printing, Publishing 20–22
05 Chemical Products 23–26
06 Manufacture of Iron, Steel, Metal; Machin-
ery; Vehicles
27–29, 34–35
07 Other Manufacturing; Recycling 30–33, 36–37, 96–97, 100
08 Construction 45
09 Trade 50–52
10 Hotels and Restaurants 55
11 Transport and Communication 60–64
12 Financial Intermediation 65–67
13 Education; Research 73, 80
14 Health Care System and Social Work 85
15 Public Administration and Defence, Social
Security
75
16 Other Services 70–74, 90–95, 98–99
a Sector classification used in the empirical analysis.
b GSOEP industry classification based on 2-digit NACE.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics, West Germany
Variable 1985 1989 1993 1998 2001 2003
MEMBER 29.94 29.01 26.74 22.44 21.59 20.04
FEMALE 38.04 38.86 41.67 42.52 44.27 45.32
MARRIED 66.88 63.62 63.36 61.12 62.04 61.19
FOREIGNER 29.45 28.84 28.03 21.25 19.36 17.62
APPRENTICESHIP 59.09 60.42 59.51 64.57 63.51 64.15
ABITUR 8.90 9.73 11.45 15.48 17.36 18.29
MISSING ABITUR 0.20 0.32 0.70 0.93 1.74 2.45
UNIVERSITY 8.80 8.84 9.73 13.23 15.39 15.88
CHR-DEM 11.50 8.62 10.06 9.54 10.01 12.83
SOC-DEM 30.15 29.75 21.09 24.20 24.10 21.18
PART-TIME 11.05 10.85 13.40 14.93 16.52 17.53
SEMISKILL-BLUE 29.52 30.03 26.60 21.57 20.46 18.51
SKILL-BLUE 20.68 18.29 18.10 16.20 16.41 15.24
WHITE-COLLAR 34.94 37.64 41.48 48.87 50.78 53.89
CIVIL SERVICE 8.26 7.67 7.67 7.86 7.29 7.59
TRAINEE 6.59 6.38 6.15 5.50 5.03 4.76
UNEMPL HIST 18.47 9.71 7.84 9.91 9.84 7.24
FIRM-SIZE19 18.55 20.11 21.05 23.05 21.85 21.63
FIRM-SIZE199 26.96 26.95 26.01 26.03 27.11 25.63
FIRM-SIZE1999 22.30 25.20 25.46 25.76 23.32 22.99
FIRM-SIZE MORE 27.88 27.48 27.17 24.99 23.55 24.04
MISSING FIRM-SIZE 4.30 0.25 0.31 0.16 4.17 5.72
SECTOR01 2.11 2.25 2.46 2.34 2.00 1.97
SECTOR02 3.01 3.12 2.44 2.31 2.08 1.87
SECTOR03 3.05 3.09 2.31 1.22 0.95 0.83
SECTOR04 2.64 2.78 2.79 2.66 2.52 2.41
SECTOR05 5.44 6.25 6.61 6.14 5.15 4.92
SECTOR06 16.90 19.22 16.56 13.86 14.38 12.73
SECTOR07 6.16 7.46 7.03 8.79 6.68 6.38
SECTOR08 8.28 7.65 7.64 5.50 5.87 5.34
SECTOR09 7.75 9.15 11.18 12.88 12.67 11.34
SECTOR10 1.68 1.82 2.13 1.54 2.05 1.84
SECTOR11 4.81 4.53 5.03 4.62 4.75 4.48
SECTOR12 2.76 3.58 3.98 4.67 4.22 4.73
SECTOR13 4.05 4.05 3.93 4.38 4.57 4.99
SECTOR14 5.67 6.55 8.15 10.12 9.40 10.00
SECTOR15 8.16 8.39 8.24 8.02 8.04 8.45
SECTOR16 6.40 7.63 7.67 9.91 11.20 11.34
MISSING SECTOR 11.11 2.48 1.85 1.04 3.44 6.38
AGE 3.76 3.74 3.78 3.84 3.92 3.98
EARNINGS 2.58 2.82 2.95 3.11 3.12 3.25
SATISFACTION 7.40 7.23 7.26 7.24 7.25 7.07
TENURE 9.76 10.16 9.84 10.17 10.15 10.65
N. of Obs. 5111 4719 4552 3765 3456 3149
Mean values of variables.
See text for details on the selected sample.
Data source: GSOEP.
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Table 5: Summary Statistics, East Germany
Variable 1993 1998 2001 2003
MEMBER 36.99 22.03 19.33 17.73
FEMALE 47.03 47.13 49.19 49.56
MARRIED 70.47 63.13 60.36 57.56
FOREIGNER 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.19
APPRENTICESHIP 75.37 74.79 71.40 72.11
ABITUR 16.17 17.96 21.35 23.00
MISSING ABITUR 0.30 1.06 1.32 1.78
UNIVERSITY 28.14 27.22 27.79 27.89
CHR-DEM 7.91 7.75 10.64 14.74
SOC-DEM 10.48 9.98 11.05 9.97
PART-TIME 7.22 9.48 12.14 14.55
SEMISKILL-BLUE 12.76 12.10 12.43 11.25
SKILL-BLUE 30.02 26.77 25.43 24.78
WHITE-COLLAR 48.22 49.25 49.71 52.16
CIVIL SERVICE 1.68 3.51 4.32 4.45
TRAINEE 7.32 8.31 8.06 7.37
UNEMPL HIST 12.17 19.91 19.85 15.44
FIRM-SIZE19 24.48 29.50 27.10 24.71
FIRM-SIZE199 33.68 34.30 33.03 31.39
FIRM-SIZE1999 22.45 19.07 18.12 19.63
FIRM-SIZE MORE 18.74 16.68 16.46 16.96
MISSING FIRM-SIZE 0.64 0.45 5.29 7.31
SECTOR01 7.42 4.91 4.09 3.56
SECTOR02 1.53 1.56 1.61 1.65
SECTOR03 0.89 0.89 1.09 1.21
SECTOR04 1.73 1.73 1.61 1.72
SECTOR05 3.51 3.07 2.47 2.67
SECTOR06 8.51 7.53 8.29 7.56
SECTOR07 3.96 6.41 4.55 4.76
SECTOR08 12.41 10.93 9.72 7.12
SECTOR09 11.67 12.16 13.23 11.94
SECTOR10 1.68 1.84 2.59 2.48
SECTOR11 7.67 5.41 5.06 4.83
SECTOR12 2.52 2.96 2.99 3.30
SECTOR13 7.17 5.19 6.67 6.16
SECTOR14 8.85 11.82 11.45 10.67
SECTOR15 11.18 10.82 9.32 9.97
SECTOR16 7.52 11.43 10.99 10.86
MISSING SECTOR 1.78 1.34 4.26 9.53
AGE 3.72 3.83 3.89 3.94
EARNINGS 2.07 2.44 2.45 2.59
SATISFACTION 6.42 6.72 6.76 6.55
TENURE 6.91 7.27 7.54 8.30
N. of Obs. 2022 1793 1738 1574
Mean values of variables.
See text for details on the selected sample.
Data source: GSOEP.
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